The Current Situation for The Kurds

Mr. Zaid M. Hashem. Editorial Department, Ferrell Center for Studies.

First, let us briefly shed light on the weight of Kurdish parties and organizations, to understand what is being worked on as an introduction to resolving the Kurdish file in Syria within the map of the interests of the countries concerned with the Syrian crisis.

Syrian Peshmerga

The Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga was established in December 2012 as a military arm of the Syrian Kurdistan Democratic Party. This party is the nucleus of the Kurdish National Council, which fell under the arm of the Syrian opposition coalition in Istanbul. By June 2015, the Syrian Peshmerga turned into a military wing of the Kurdish National Council headed by Ibrahim Barro, who was born in Amuda and resides in Erbil, who was the leader of the Yekiti party until December 23, 2018. Northern Iraq.

The Kurdish Democratic Union classifies the Kurdish National Council as a hostile force, and this is confirmed by the joint head of the Union Party, Asia Abdullah, who said that the Kurdish National Council belongs to the coalition that hosts the gains of the Kurds and hostile the existence of the Kurdish people and denies their rights, and its factions attack and kills Kurdish civilians. According to her description.

The Syrian Peshmerga forces are estimated to number in the thousands, estimated at the Ferrell Center by 8,000 Syrian Kurdish fighters, who have received military training over the past years in northern Iraq under the supervision of the United States, and do not follow the SDF militias and are not in agreement with them.

Kurdish National Council: a political coalition that includes 15 parties and factions of Syrian Kurds, which enjoys international recognition and care from the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Masoud Barzani, but has limited influence in the Syrian Kurdish street. These parties in Syria are:

• Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria (Yekiti) (Secretary Suleiman Osu)
• The Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (Secretary Saud Al-Mulla)
• The Kurdish Reform Movement in Syria (Secretary Faisal Yusuf)
• The Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria (Secretary Nimat Dawood)
• The Kurdish National Democratic Party in Syria (Secretary Tahir Sefouk)
• The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (Party)
• The Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Democratic Yekiti) (Secretary Hajar Ali)
• Kurdistan Democratic Unity Party (Secretary Kamiran Haj Abdo)
• The Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria (Secretary Shallal Kudo)
• The Kurdish Left Party in Syria (Secretary Mahmoud Mulla)
• The Kurdish Future Movement in Syria (party leader Siamand Hajo)
• The Kurdish Future Movement in Syria (Public Relations Office Officer Narin Matini)
• Syria Yezidi Council (President Mezkin Yusuf)
• The Parti Kurdistan Vanguard in Syria (Secretary Ismail Hassaf)

Information: The number of Kurdish parties and organizations in Syria is 46 parties and organizations, that is, at least 46 leaders! Refer to the full research on the website of the Ferrel Center for Studies under the title: The Kurds have not posed any danger in the past, are they now dangerous?

SDF

The formation of the SDF militia was announced on October 10, 2015. The real founder is the United States of America, on the pretext that it is supplying weapons to a group fighting ISIS. SDF is the abbreviation for the Syrian Democratic Forces; a group of armed factions comprises: People’s Protection Units, about 15 thousand people, and women’s protection units, about 5 thousand people, its backbone, and it belongs to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party. Other factions also include:

We are not finished yet … there are other groups, including Falcon Falcons, Brigade Jihad for the sake of Allah, the Fadel al-Shibli Brigades, Ahrar Jarablus, the Black Lions of the Euphrates, the Lions of the Black Ambassador, the Brigade of the Soldiers of the Two Holy Mosques, the Furat Brigade of Jarablus.

The fiercest fight by the YPG and YPG was in Ain al-Arab against ISIS, which attacked it in September 2014, and then the battles lasted for months until mid-2015.

The US Department of Defense talks about 45,000 fighters, including half of the Arabs, including some estimates, raising the number to 70,000. Whatever the number, Washington is their primary supporter, politically and militarily, with all kinds of equipment and air coverage.

Turkey is very hostile to these militias and considers the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria a branch of the “terrorist” PKK, according to its description.

American direct and public support, by sending thousands of trucks of equipment, weapons and military equipment, is entering from northern Iraq towards the areas occupied by SDF. This support was confidential with the Free and Support organizations in the past.

Opened US military bases in the areas of the control of SDF. Recently, American forces stationed west of the Euphrates were drawn towards its east, where the Kurds’ primary influence is, to focus the American presence on oil wells on the Syrian island and east of the Euphrates.

This important development comes in light of the bad situation of the Syrian economy, which has deteriorated significantly during the past year and approached the brink of collapse. Washington occupied oil wells in collusion with SDF to increase economic pressure on Damascus, which is an occupation without real development and investment for those wells, and the intention is to deprive the Syrian treasury of resources for reconstruction …

What does Washington want to support the separatists?

Although the separatists fell into the hole several times, they did not and will not learn, thinking that Washington “loves them” and their aim is to create a state for them because they are their loved ones … Washington uses the card of the separatist Kurds for two purposes:

The first goal: to wave this paper to Turkey whenever Erdogan tries to tweet outside the NATO squadron.

The second goal: arranging the SDF and the Kurdish National Council to be involved in the upcoming political settlement on terms that would achieve American interests, i.e. Washington remains a “separatist focus” in eastern Syria.

The most important goal of the American occupation is to get Iran out of Syria.

If the United States could establish a Kurdish state at the expense of the Syrian territories, it would not be too late.

What happened before?

Syria played on the Kurdish file with Turkey, and it was part of the discussions of the meetings of officials of the two countries, including the recent meeting between Mamluk and Fidal, in which the Kurdish file occupied a large area in the discussions. The Syrian policy in this file was a pressure card on Ankara, which made it retreat in several points and began to change its policy, including jumping into the Russian bosom whenever the trick narrowed and saw an American response.

Turkey concluded the de-escalation zone agreement and moved a large portion of its terrorists to the north. In addition to the Astana, Sochi and related meetings series, this was accompanied by the Syrian army achieving victories on the central and southern fronts, and the fear of the Kurdish file was bombing Erdogan’s rides, with Washington and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi using the Kurds against Turkey.

Then came the Syrian play that Ankara sees as more dangerous than what was reported … Here, Ankara started working hard to win Damascus, sometimes through Tehran because it is also concerned with this file, and sometimes through Russia to put pressure on Syria. Iraq has become the Kurds in it an independent entity and has no power … while the Syrian-Kurdish file is open to its death in the highly complex Syrian crisis, and Turkey will want or not, it will agree with Syria on an issue that affects its national security, and the territorial integrity of Syria matters to Ankara to a great extent.

What about Russia?

Russia does not strongly oppose Washington’s goals and its exploitation of the Kurds, whether with regard to Turkey or Iran, because it wants to distance Syria from any military confrontation that threatens Russian existence and interests, and it does not mind the participation of the opposition, including separatist Kurds, in governance through the Astana Agreement and the Constitutional Committee.

Russia was his godfather, and Putin was the architect of his details, through Lavrov. The Russians have stated that there are points that can be discussed with the Kurds on issues of autonomy … So; Moscow does not oppose a solution that brings together Washington’s interests that correspond to its interests but within the Syrian territorial integrity while accepting a limited margin of American interests.

That is why the Syrian Arab Army entered the areas occupied by SDF under Russian coordination between Damascus, Damascus, and Ankara, and it is interesting that Washington did not oppose this agreement. The question: Why?

What is going on now?

Washington is working to conclude a reconciliation between the Kurdish National Council and its Peshmerga military arm (the Saudis), the Democratic Union Party and its military arm, the People’s Protection Units (Pyd), who dominate the SDF and occupy more than 20% of the area of ​​Syria. The goal is clear: build a united Kurdish front with a political character that unites the broader spectrum of the Kurdish component to plunge them into the next political process with Russian approval and conditional Syrian consent.

Syria never considered the Kurds an enemy and did not target them militarily, despite their appeasement of the American occupier and numerous attacks against the Syrian army and security forces, on the contrary; it provided them with cover and military support to confront the victory and ISIS before the American occupation, but they turned after hearing the promises from Washington, and then returned to Damascus and then They turned, then …

To this day, Damascus does not consider them an enemy, but rather a party that can be dealt with. Therefore, two security squares remain in Qamishli and Hasaka, and the Turkish army and the Muslim Brotherhood did not dare occupy Qamishli due to the presence of the Syrian army only, not the heroics of Qasd and its sisters. The army returned to the border areas in accordance with Qasd, as part of an agreement concluded by Moscow with Ankara with American blessing, announced by Trump at the time.

Completing the reconciliation between the Syrian Peshmerga and the People’s Protection Units achieves American-Russian and Turkish interests, and imposes a mini-model on the northern region of Iraq in terms of content, not form. The northern Iraq region is governed by the Barzani family, an American, Turkish and Israeli ally, and the Talabani family, an Iranian and Russian ally (former Soviet).

What is currently being worked out, according to the opinion of the Ferrel Center for Studies, is to present the regions of the eastern Euphrates and the Syrian island in the form of a unified bloc as a political package that includes Kurdish and Arab powers, which constitute an effective weight in the Syrian crisis. Washington, Moscow, Riyadh, Turkey and the owner of the land, Syria, are coordinating this package. They are gestures, not agreements or agreements, so is this simple ?! …

Russia As we mentioned, Syria wants a stable country in which the crisis ends with a political settlement that keeps it away from confrontation, to reap the fruits after a long season of “agriculture” and waiting. Moscow aspires to the stable Middle East in which it penetrates economically, politically and militarily, so it will support any agreement that enhances its interests by settling the reservation of the territorial integrity of Syria and agreed upon by the parties concerned, and it is okay to achieve the interests of Washington and Ankara to the minimum.

Moscow cannot bypass them because they are represented on the ground strongly by militias and armed factions affiliated with it, which have participated in Astana and Geneva, and they must find a political solution as a counterpart to Damascus.

Is there a specific wording for any agreement?

There is no fixed formulation until the moment, and no capital has put forth an integrated vision of what it wants, namely, the efforts of the separatists and the aspirations that are not taken seriously when the real owners of the land meet … on the assumption that Washington managed to unify the Kurdish parties after a long series of marathon meetings, whether in the rules The Americans are in Hasaka and also with French mediation, or the devastation meetings in Ain Arab or in Erbil, will the matter be over?

Damascus has strong influence in several Arab tribes east of the Euphrates, and these tribes owe allegiance to Syria, such as the tribes of Jabour al-Akidat al-Sharabi al-Sharabi, these represent the largest weight of the population formation on the Syrian island, and most of these tribes have fighters within the national defense formations, and this is a vital point that cannot be crossed over The launch gives Damascus great power over there.

Another matter; let us say that only 50% of the SDF militias are Syrian Arabs, driven by economic conditions first, and we confirm this, then the poor security situation during the previous years in the absence of the Syrian Arab Army to join SFD, just as they entered SDF for the sake of the money they will get out of for the same The reason … but who will pay for them? The financier is coming…

Damascus walks between raindrops

Damascus moved the tribal file east of the Euphrates and the island, allowing the return of “Nawwaf Ragheb Al-Bashir”, Sheikh of the Sheikhs of the Bakara tribe, mediated by Russia and Iran, which formed an effective tribal force loyal to the Syrian state in Deir Al-Zour. The move restored a sort of balance to the countryside of West Deir Ezzor and filled a vacuum that Washington would exploit in collusion with SDF.

Sheikh Muhammad al-Faris, the Sheikh of the Tay tribe, also formed a force of national defense in Qamishli, which had had an effective role from the first day of events in Syria and testified to him of his national and consistent positions.

Sheikh Hamidi Daham al-Jarba, the sheik of the Shammar tribe in Syria, possesses a clan force called Sanidad, who is affiliated with SDF. Recently, he reached out to Damascus through the Russians and began to change his positions.

There are auxiliary forces from the Al-Aqeedat tribe, the main tribe of the eastern Deir al- Zawr countryside, as well as the al- Buhamad tribe in Raqqa who own a national defense force that had a strong role in liberating the Raqqa countryside from ISIS.

In September 2019, Sheikh Nawaf returned the Damocles sheik Jabour tribe, after a seven-year stint in Riyadh. He visited Iraq, Damascus, and Hasaka. The most important in his comments was (the unity and sovereignty of Syria and the Arabism of the East Euphrates region. Saudi-Syrian relations are gradually returning …). Sheikh Nawaf is affiliated with Saudi Arabia, and the Jabour tribe is one of the major tribes of the city of Hasaka and its countryside. This is evidence of Damascus’s tendency to strengthen the Arab current in the face of currents that glorify the Ottoman Sultanate and another Kurdish separatist one. It remains to be known that the number of Syrians belonging to the Jabour tribe in the Syrian island is close to a million.

They are successive moves by Damascus with the political and social influence that will be reflected on the ground in the island and east of the Euphrates, to adjust the balance of forces to their advantage. That is why we see at the Ferrel Center that the restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia is important, and your principles of support are unrelated to politics. There are no principles in politics.

The American response

Remember when Trump announced his withdrawal from Syria that we had wagered at the Ferrell Center for Studies that he would not withdraw … and would not withdraw unless he achieved his goals or coffins … Washington occupied and occupied the oil and gas fields of the island and east of Deir Ezzor, and shared his imports with the militias, in the hope that the international community would recognize these militias As a major force.

It also made the Hasaka governorate a large prison for ISIS prisoners and their families as a regional and global threat card and made this paper in the hands of SDF. This is like giving a boy an unknown weapon to use … Now Washington is trying to connect the Syrian separatists with their counterparts in northern Iraq to pressure and blackmail the four countries and with them Russia.

Its bases are expanding there, as is happening now at Tel Baidar base on the international road known as the M4. In October 2019, the US military withdrew from the base. Now all Kurdish militia elements have been expelled and expelled from them and prevented from entering them. He also did at the al-Wazir base, north of Hasaka. Dozens of soldiers, vehicles, armored vehicles, and equipment have arrived at those bases, and work is also underway to establish a large base in Tel Brak. Are these occupying forces intending to withdraw ?!

Mike Pines, the American Vice President, said that the United States will not allow Moscow, Tehran, or Damascus to control the oil fields in northern Syria.
What will SDF respond to?

QSD moved quickly to find itself squeezed in the corner. After splits in its ranks, it returned to restoration. It released detainees from its prisons, accusing them of belonging to ISIS, as long as they entered into its ranks. In late December, it released 83 prisoners from ISIS, and a few days ago it released 50 detainees in Raqqa, according to the Justice Office of the “Raqqa Civil Council”, after sponsoring elders and notables from the Raqqa clans.

On the following day, the Qasd militia arrested 15 young men, east of Raqqa, specifically in the village of Hos, in the Karama district, and withdrew them for forced recruitment into its ranks, as it used the 17th Division camp for its military activities.

Qasd is also arresting anyone suspected of supporting the Syrian state. The latest incidents took place three days ago in the village of Hawiziya, east of Al-Shaddadi, south of Hasaka, and arrested 11 young men on charges of belonging to the Civil Defense Forces.

SDF released detainees from its prisons, accusing them of belonging to ISIS. Raqqa January 2020 Ferrell

Has popular resistance started?

Many incidents against SDF recently were not mentioned by the media. Only during the past few days, two unknown persons on a motorcycle assassinated a member of SDF in Al-Shuhail, Deir Al-Zour. One member was killed and three others were wounded by SDF when an explosive device was detonated in Ein Issa, Khirbet Hadla, north of Raqqa.

Another explosive device in the city ​​of Raqqa hit two Asayish items on Saturday 18.01.2020. Then, an “unidentified” armed group attacked a Qasd patrol in the village of Haddadiya, south of Hasaka, in which two members were killed and three were wounded. Friday 24.01.2020, an explosive device kills two members of Qasd and wounds others near the village of Al-Susah, east of Deir Ezzor.

Also, a member of the Qasd Public Security was killed by unknown persons near the Roman Bridge, and his body was found inside the garbage dump in the area west of the city of Raqqa.On Monday 27.01.2020, a member of the SDF was killed and another one was wounded in the village of Al-Tukaihi, east of Basra, in Deir Al-Zour.

Tuesday 28.01, an SDF member was killed and the “Maryam Al-Najjar” leadership was wounded when an explosive device exploded in their car in the village of Al-Muhammadiyah, east of Al-Karama. While preparing this research at the Ferrell Center for Studies, an informant working in SDF was killed after his car was burned in Hawaij, in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor.

ISIS claimed responsibility for some of the incidents that took place in the past few months, but most of the killings of ISIS members remained against an unknown … Who is this unknown?

The bottom line and the opinion of the Ferrell Center for Studies

In conjunction with the victories of the Syrian army in Idlib and Aleppo provinces, the file east of the Euphrates is running, sometimes accelerating or slowing down. When victorious Damascus negotiates in Idlib, it will be stronger. The separatist file faces two solutions, which are not third: returning to Syria’s embrace of understandings or returning by force. Syria may be satisfied with making some concessions, such as giving the militias there some advantages or understandings in the way of managing official institutions, but we should not and do not expect Damascus to accept any near or far form of self-rule.

The file east of the Euphrates and the Syrian island is premature, and it must be largely moved, and Damascus is capable.

Entering Arab countries with close Syrian monitoring on the line is beneficial to curb Turkish turmoil and the Turkish process, but the UAE and Saudi hostility to the Turkish Brotherhood should not be an excuse to give the separatists what they want … beware. When the understandings are accomplished, the US occupation becomes uncovered, while ensuring that Washington will create an excuse to stay.

If all peaceful efforts to solve the dilemma fail, there is a solution to the resistance and the hand of the Syrian Arab tribes, and Damascus remains out of the eyes …