The Khazarian Mafia and the Building of Ukraine: We Were Warned 70 Years Ago

A major indelible blot was thrown on the American shield by the Nuremberg war trials in which, in clear violation of the spirit of our own Constitution, we tried people under ex post facto laws for actions performed in carrying out the orders of their superiors. Such a travesty of justice could have no other result than teaching the Germans, as the Palestine matter taught the Arabs, that our government had no sense of justice. The persisting bitterness from this foul fiasco is seen in the popular quip in Germany to the effect that in the third World War England will furnish the navy, France the foot soldiers, America the airplanes, and Germany the war-criminals. In addition to lacking the solid foundation of legal precedent our war trials afforded a classic example of he law‘s delay. Seven German soldiers, ranging in rank from sergeant to general, were executed as lates June 7, 1951, Whatever these men and those executed before them may or may not have done, the long elay had two obvious results, five years of jobs for the U.S. bureaucrats involved and a continuing irritation of the German people, an irritation desired by Zionists and Communists.

The Germans had been thoroughly alarmed and aroused against Communism and used the phrase Gegenelt Bolshewismus(Against World Communism) on placards and parade banners while Franklin Rooseveltwas courting it (We need those votes).

Consequently the appointment of John J. McCloy as High Commissioner (July 2,1949) appeared as an affront, for this man was Assistant Secretary of War at the time of the implementation of the executive order which abolishes rules designed to prevent the admission of Communists to the War Department; and also, before a Congressional Committee appointed to investigate Communism in the War Department, he testified that Communism was not a decisive factor in granting or withholding an army commission. Not only McCloy‘s record (Chapter VIII, c ) but his manner in dealing with the Germans tended to encourage a permanent hostility toward America. Thus, as late as 1950, he was still issuing orders to them not merely plainly but bluntly and sharply (Drew Middleton in the New York Times, Feb, 7, 1950).

Volumes could not record all our follies in such matters as dismantling German plants for the Soviet Union while spending nearly a billion a year to supply food and other essentials to the German people, who could have supported themselves by work in the destroyed plants. For details on results from dismantling a few chemical plants in the Ruhr, see On the Record by Dorothy Thompson, Washington Evening Star, June 14, 1949. The crowning failure of our policy, however, came in 1950. This is no place for a full discussion or our attitude toward the effort of 510,000 Jews—supported, of course, from the outside as shown in Chapter IV, above—to ride herd on 62,000,000 Germans (1933, the figures were respectively about 600,000 and 69,000,000 by 1939) or the ghastly sequels. It appeared as sheer deception, however, to give the impression, as Mr. Acheson did, that we were doing what we could to secure the cooperation of Western Germany, when Mr. Milton Katz was at the time (his resignation was effective August 19, 1951) our overall Ambassador in Europe and, under the far from vigorous Marshall, the two top assistant secretaries of Defense were the Eastern European Jewess, Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, and Mr. Marx Leva ! Nothing is said or implied by the author against Mr. Katz, Mrs. Rosenberg or Mr. Marx Leva, or others such as Mr. Max Lowinthal and Mr. Benjamin J. Brttenwieser, who have been prominent figures in our recent dealings with Germany, the former as Assistant to Commissioner McCloy and the latter as Assistant High Commissioner of the United States. As far as the author knows, all five of these officials are true to their convictions. The sole point here stressed is the unsound policy of sending unwelcome people to a land whose good will we are seeking, or perhaps only pretending to seek.

According to Forster‘s A Measure of Freedom (p. 86), there is a steady growth of pro-German sentiment in the super Patriotic press in the United States. The context suggests that Mr. Forster is referring in derision to certain pro-American sheets of small circulation, most of which do not carry advertising. These English-language papers with their strategically sound viewpoints can, however, have no appreciable circulation in Germany, if any at all, and Germans are forced to judge America by its actions and its personnel. In both, we have moved for the most part rather to repel them than to draw them into our orbit as friends.

If we really wish friendship and peace with the German people, and really want them on our side in case of another world-wide war, our choice of General Eisenhower as Commander-in-chief in Europe was most unfortunate. He is a tactful, genial man, but to the Germans he remains—now and in history—as the comander who directed the destruction of their cities with civilian casualties running as high as a claimed 40,000 in a single night, and directed the U.S. retreat from the out-skirts of Berlin. This retreat was both an affront to our victorious soldiers and a tragedy for Germany, because of the millions of additional people it placed under the Soviet yoke, and because of the submarine construction plants, guided missile works, and other factories it presented to the Soviet. Moreover, General Eisenhower was Supreme Commander in Germany during the hideous atrocities perpetrated upon the German people by displaced persons after the surrender (Chapter IV, above). There is testimony to General Eisenhower‘s lack of satisfaction with conditions in Germany in 1945, but he made, as far as the author knows, no strong gesture such as securing his assignment to another post. Finally, according to Mr.. Henry Morgenthau (New York Post, November 24, 1947), as quoted in Human Events and in W. H. Chamberlin‘s America‘s Second Crusade, General Eisenhower said: The whole German population is a synthetic paranoid and added that the best cure would be to let them stew in their own juice.

All in all, sending General Eisenhower to persuade the West Germans to let bygones by bygones (CBS, January 20, 1951), even before the signing of a treaty of peace, was very much as if President Grant had sent General Sherman to Georgia to placate the Georgians five years after the burning of Atlanta and the march to the sea, except that the personable Eisenhower had the additional initial handicap of Mr. Katz breathing on his neck, and Mrs. Anna Rosenberg in high place in the Department of Defense in Washington! The handicap may well be insurmountable, for many Germans, whether rightly or not, believe Jews are responsible for all their woes. Thus, after the Eisenhower appointment, parading Germans took to writing on their placards not their old motto Gegen Welt Bolshewismus but ―Ohne mich (AP despatch from Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, February 4, 1951) which may be translated ―Leave me out.

In this Germany, whose deep war wounds were kept constantly festering by our policy, our government has stationed some six divisions of American troops. Why? In answering the question remember that Soviet Russia is next door, while our troops, supplies, and reinforcements have to cross the Atlantic!

Moreover, if the Germans, fighting from and for their own homeland, failed with a magnificent army of 240 combat divisions (ex-President Herbert Hoover, broadcast on Our National Policies on This Crisis, Dec. 20, 1950) to defeat Soviet Russia, what do we expect to accomplish with six divisions ? Of course, in World War II many of Germany‘s divisions were used on her west front and America gave the Soviet eleven billion dollars worth of German divisions used against Stalin, six is a very small number for any military purpose envisioning victory. Can it be that the six divisions have been offered by some State Department schemer as World War III‘s European parallels to the sitting ducks at Pearl Harbor and the cockle shells in Philippine waters ? (see Chapter VII, d, below and Design for War, by Frederick R. Sanborn, The Devin-adair Company, New York, 1951). According to the military historian and critic, Major Hoffman Nickerson, our leaders have some undisclosed purpose of their own, if they foresee war they intend that war to begin either with a disaster or a helter-skelter retreat (The Freeman, July 2, 1951). In any case the Soviet Union, whether from adverse internal conditions, restive satellites, fear of our atomic bomb stockpile, confidence in the achievement of its objectives through diplomacy and infiltration, or other reasons, has not struck violently at our first bait of six divisions. But, under our provocation the Soviet has quietly got busy.

For five years after the close of World War II, we maintained in Germany two divisions and the Soviet leaders made little or no attempt to prepare the East German transportation network for possible war traffic (U. S. News and World Report, January 24, 1951). Rising, however, to the challenge of our four additional divisions (1951), the Soviet took positive action. Here is the story (AP dispatch from Berlin in Washington Times-Herald, April 30, 1951):

Russian engineers have started rebuilding the strategic rail and road system from Germany‘s Elbe River, East German sources disclosed today. The main rail lines linking East Germany and Poland with Russia are being double-tracked, the sources said. The engineers are rebuilding Germany‘s highway and bridge network to support tanks and other heavy artillery vehicles.