The Khazarian Mafia and the Building of Ukraine: We Were Warned 70 Years Ago

In January, 1949, the experienced Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota left the House and his membership on the Committee to take his seat in the Senate. Promotion to the Senate (Dec. 1, 1950) likewise cost the Committee the services of Congressman Richard Nixon of California, the member most active in the preliminaries to the trial of Alger Hiss. In the election of 1950, Representative Francis Case of South Dekota was advanced to the Senate.

After a single term on the Committee, Congressman Burr P. Harrison of Virginia became a member of the Ways and Means Committee on Un-American Activities. Thus, when the Committee was reconstituted at the opening of the 82nd Congress in January, 1951, only one man, Chairman John S. Wood of Georgia, had had more than one full two-year term of service and a majority of the nine members were new.

The Committee, like all others, needs letters of encouragement to offset pressure from pro-Communist elements, but there were evidences in 1951 of its revitalization. On April 1, 1951, it issued a report entitled The Communist Peace Offensive, which it described as the most dangerous hoax ever devised by the international Communist conspiracy (see Red-educators in the Communist Peace Offensive, National Council for American Education, 1 Maiden Lane, New York38, N.Y.) Moreover, in 1951 the committee was again probing the important question of Communism in the motion picture industries at Hollywood, California.

Finally, late in 1951 the Un-American Activities Committee issued a―brand new publication, a Guide Book to Subversive Organizations, highly recommended by The Americanism Division, The American Legion (copies may be had from the National Americanism Division, The American Legion, 700 N. Pennsylvania St., Indianapolis, Ind. See, also, pp. 101-103, above).

Fortunately, the Senate Judiciary Committee is also accomplishing valuable work in the exposure of the nature and methods of the Communist infiltration. Its work is referred to, its chairman Senator McCarran of Nevada is quoted, and its documents are represented by excerpts here and there in this book. The Rules Committee of the House was restored to its traditional power by the 82nd Congress in 1951 and may also prove an effective brake on bills for implementing the dangerous policies of an incompetent, poorly advised, or treasonable leadership in the executive departments.

As a last resort, however, a President of the United States or any other member of the Executive or Judicial Branches of the government can be removed by impeachment. Article I, Section 2, paragraph 5; Article I, Section 3, paragraph 6; Article II, Section 4, paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution name the circumstances under which, and provide explicitly the means by which, a majority of the representatives and two-thirds of the senators can remove a president who is guilty of misdemeanors or shows inability to perform the high functions of his office.

Surely some such construction might have been placed upon Mr. Truman‘s gross verbal attack (1950) upon the United States Marine Corps, whose members were at the time dying in Korea, or upon his repeated refusal to cooperate with Canada, with Congress, or with the Courts in facing up to the menace of the 43,217 known Communists said by J. Edgar Hoover (AP dispatch, Dallas Times-Herald, February 8, 1950).

The matter of President Truman‘s unwillingness to move against Communism came to a head with the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Under the title, Necessity for Legislation, the two Houses of Congress found as follows:

(1) There exists a world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization. . .

(2) The Communist network in the United States is inspired and controlled in large part by foreign agents who are sent into the United States ostensibly as attaches of foreign legations, affiliates of international organizations, members of trading commissions, and in similar capacities, but who use their diplomatic or semi-diplomatic status as a shield behind which to engage in activities prejudicial to the public security.

(3) There are, under our present immigration laws, numerous aliens who have been found to be deportable, many of whom are in the subversive, criminal, or immoral classes who are free to roam the country at will without supervision or control. . .

(4) The Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent successes of communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States and to the existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States.

A measure for curbing Communism in the United States, prepared in the light of the above preamble, was approved by both Senate and House. It was then sent to the President. What did he do?
He vetoed it.

Thereupon both Senate and House (September 22, 1950) overrode the President‘s veto by far more than the necessary two-thirds majorities, and the internal Security Act became Public Law 831—81st Congress—Second Session. The enforcement of the law, of course, became the responsibility of its implacable enemy, the head of the Executive Branch of our government! But the President‘s efforts to block the antiCommunists did not end with that historic veto. President Truman Thursday rejected a Senate committee‘s request for complete files on the State Department‘s loyalty-security cases on the ground that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest (AP dispatch, Washington, April 3, 1952). To what public did Mr. Truman refer? The situation was summed up well by General MacArthur in a speech before a joint session of the Mississippi legislature (March 22, 1952). The general stated that our policy is leading us toward a communist state with as dreadful certainty as though the leaders of the Kremlin themselves were charting our course.

In view of his veto of the Internal Security Act and his concealment of security data on government employees from Congressional committees, it is hard to exonerate Mr. Truman from the suspicion of having more concern for leftist votes than for the safety or survival of the United States. Such facts naturally suggest an inquiry into the feasibility of initiating the process of impeachment.

Another possible ground for impeachment might be the President‘s apparent violation of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 11, which vests in Congress the power To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. This authority of the Congress has never been effectively questioned. Thus in his Political Observations (1795) James Madison wrote The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the Legislature the power of declaring a state of war

(quoted from Clipping of Note, No. 38, The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., Irvington-on-Hudaon, New York). Subsequent interpreters of our basic State Paper, except perhaps some of those following in the footsteps of Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (Chapter III, above), have concurred. It was seemingly in an effort to avoid the charge of violating this provision of the Constitution that President Truman, except for a reported occasional slip of the tongue, chose to refer to his commitment of our troops in Korea as a police action and not a war. Referring to the possibility of President Truman‘s sending four additional divisions to Europe where there was no war, Senator Byrd of Virginia said: But if by chance he does ignore Congress, Congress has ample room to exercise its authority by the appropriations method and it would be almost grounds for impeachment (UP dispatch in Washington Times-Herald, March 15, 1951). The distinguished editor and commentator David Lawrence (U.S. News and World Report, April 20, 1951) also brought up the question of impeachment: If we are to grow technical, Congress, too, has some constitutional rights. It can impeach President Truman not only for carrying on a war in Korea without a declaration of war by Congress, but primarily for failing to let our troops fight the enemy with all the weapons at their command.

The question of President Truman‘s violation of the Constitution in the matter of committing our troops in Korea has been raised with overwhelming logic by Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota. Article 43 of the United Nations charter, as the Senator points out, provides that members nations of the UN shall supply armed forces in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Thus the starting of the Truman-Acheson war in Korea not only violated the United States Constitution, but completely lacked United Nations authority, until such authority was voted retroactively! (Washington Times-Herald, May 17, 1951;

(also see Chapter VI, d, above.)

The House in the 81 st Congress several times overrode a Truman veto by more than the Constitutional two-thirds vote. Even in that 81 st Congress, more than five-sixths of the Senators voted to override the President‘s veto of the McCarran-Mundt-Nixon anti-Communist bill, which became Public Law 831. With the retirement of Mrs. Helen Douglas and other noted administration supporters, and Mr. Vito Marcantonio, the 82nd Congress is probably even less inclined than the predecessor Congress to tolerate the Truman attitude toward the control of subversives and might not hesitate in a moment of grave national peril to certify to the Senate for possible impeachment for a violation of the Constitution the name of a man so dependent on leftist votes or so sympathetic with alien thought that he sees no menace, merely a red herring, in Communism.

With reference again to impeachment, an examination of the career of other high executives including the Secretary of State might possibly find one or more of them who might require investigation on the suspicion of unconstitutional misdemeanors.espite the bitter fruit of Yalta, Mr. Acheson never issued a recantation.

He never repudiated his affirmation of lasting fidelity to his beloved friend, Alger Hiss, who was at Yalta as the newly appointed State Department Director of Special Political Affairs.

Despite the Chinese attack on our troops in Korea, Mr. Acheson never, to the author‘s knowing, admitted the error, if not the treason, of the policy of his department‘s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs down to and including the very year of 1950, when these Chinese ommunists, the darlings of the dominant Leftists of our State Department, attacked us in the moment of ur victory over the Communists of North Korea.

What then will you do with the fact that as concerning Soviet Russia, from Yalta to this day, every blunder in American foreign policy has turned out to be what he Kremlin might have wished this country to do?? All you can say is that if there had been a sinister design it would look like this (The Freeman, June 18, 1951.)

General Marshall was at Yalta as Chief of Staff of U.S. Army. According to press reports, he never remembered what he was doing the night before Pearl Harbor. At Yalta, it was not memory but judgment that failed him for he was the Superior Officer who tacitly, if not heartily, approved the military deals along the Elbe and the Yalu, deals which are still threatening to ruin our country. General Ambassador Marshall not only failed miserably in China; Secretary of State Marshall took no effective steps whin a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, according to Senator Ferguson of Michigan, handed him a memorandum stating in part; It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson. It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity (INS, Washington Times-Herald, July 24, 1950). The reference to Acheson was to Undersecretary Acheon, as he then was.

Unfortunately in late 1951, when General Marshall ceased to be secretary of Defense, he was replaced by an other man, Robert A. Lovett, who, whatever his personal views, carried nevertheless the stigma of having been Undersecretary of State from July, 1947, to January, 1949 (Congressional Directory, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 365), when our opposition in China was being ruined under the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall.

The pro-Soviet accomplishments of the high-placed leftists and their dupes in our government are brilLiantly summed up by Edna Lonigan in Human Events (Sept. 8, 1948): Our victorious armies halted where Stalin wished. His followers managed Dumbarton Oaks, UN, UNRRA, our Polish and Spanish policies.

They gave Manchuria and Northern Korea to Communism. They dismantled German industry, ran the Nuremberg trials and even sought to dictate our economic policy in Japan. Their greatest victory was the Morgenthau Plan.

And the astounding thing is that except for the dead (Roosevelt, Hillman, Hopkins, Winant) and Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Hiss, and General Marshall, most of those chiefly responsible for our policy as described above were still in power in June, 1952!