The Soviet got busy not only in transportation but in personnel and equipment. According to Drew Middleton (New York Times, August 17, 1951), All tewnty-six divisions of the Soviet group of armies in Eastern Germany are being brought to full strength for the first time since 1946. Also, a stream of newly produced tanks, guns, trucks, and light weapons is flowing to divisional and army bases. There were reports also if the strengthening of satellite armies.
These strategic moves followed our blatantly announced plans to increase our forces in Germany. Moreover, according to Woodrow Wyatt, British Undersecretary for War, the Soviet Union had under arms in the summer of 1951, 215 divisions and more than 4,000,000 men (AP dispatch in New York Times, July 16, 1951). Can it be possible that our State Department is seeking ground conflict with this vast force not only on their frontier but on the particular frontier which is closest to their factories and to their most productive farm lands?
In summary, the situation of our troops in Germany is part of a complex world picture which is being changed daily by new world situations such as our long delayed accord with Spain and a relaxing of the terms of them is our dependence, at least in large part, on the French transportation network which is in daily jeopardy of paralysis by the Communists, who are numerically the strongest political party in France.
Another is the nature of the peace treaty which will some day be ratified by the government of West Ger many and the Senate of the United States, and thereafter the manner of implementing that treaty.
As we leave the subject, it can only be said that the situation of our troops in Germany is precarious and that the question of our relations with Germany demands the thought of the ablest and most patriotic people in America—a type not overly prominent in the higher echelons of our Department of State in recent years.
(c) Having by three colossal mistakes set the stage for possible disaster in the Far East, in the Middle East, and in Germany, we awaited the enemy‘s blow which could be expected to topple us to defeat. It came in the Far East.
As at Pearl Harbor, the attack came on a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950. On that day North Korean Communist troops crossed the 38th parallel from the Soviet Zone to the recently abandoned U.S. Zone in Korea and moved rapidly to the South. Our government knew from several sources about these Communist troops before we moved our troops out on January 1, 1949, leaving the South Koreans to their fate. For instance, in March, 1947, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, U.S. Commander in Korea, stated that Chinese Communist troops were participating in the training of a Korean army of 500,000 in Russian-held North Korea (The China Story, p. 51).
Despite our knowledge of the armed might of the forces in North Korea; despite our vaunted failure to arm our former wards, the South Koreans; despite our hands off statements placing Formosa and Korea outside our defense perimeter and generally giving Communists the green light in the Far East; and despite President Truman‘s statement as late as May 4, 1950, that there would be no shooting war, we threw United States troops from Japan into that unhappy peninsula, without the authority of Congress, to meet the Communist invasion.
Our troops from Japan had been trained for police duty rather than as combat units and were without the proper weapons (P.L. Franklin in National Republic, January, 1951). This deplorable fact was confirmed officially by former Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, who testified that our troops in Korea were not equipped with the things that you would need if you were to fight a hostile enemy.
They were staffed and equipped for occupation, not for war or an offensive (testimony before combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate, June, 1951, as quoted by U. S. News and World Report, June 22, 1951, pp. 21-22). Our administration had seen to it also that those troops which became our South Korean allies were also virtually unarmed, for the Defense Department had no establishment for Korea. It was under the State Department at that time (Secretary Johnson‘s testimony).
Under such circumstances, can any objective thinker avoid the conclusion that the manipulators of United States policy confidently anticipated the defeat and destruction of our forces, which Secretary Acheson advised President Truman to commit to Korea in June, 1950?
But the leftist manipulators of the State Department, whether in that department or on the outside, were soon confronted by a miracle they had not foreseen. The halting of the North Korean Communists by a handful of men under such handicaps was one of the remarkable and heroic pages in history credit for which must be shared by our brave front-line fighting men; their field commanders including Major General William F. Dean, who was captured by the enemy, and Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, who died in Korea; and their Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
The free world applauded what seemed to be a sudden reversal of our long policy of surrender to Soviet force in the Far East, and the United Nations gave its endorsement to our administration‘s venture in Korea. But the same free world was stunned when it realized the significance of our President‘s order to the U.S. Seventh Fleet to take battle station between Formosa and the Chinese mainland and stop Chiang from harassing the mainland Communists.
Prior to the Communist aggression in Korea, Chiang was dropping ammunition from airplanes to unsubdued Nationalist troops (so-called guerrillas), whose number by average estimates of competent authorities was placed at approximately 1,250,000; was bombing Communist concentrations; was making hit-and-run raids on Communist-held ports, and was intercepting supplies which were being sent from Britain and the United States to the Chinese Communists.
Repeated statements by Britain and America that such shipments were of no use to the Communist armies were demolished completely by Mr. Winston Churchill, who revealed on the floor of the House of Commons (May 7, 1951, UP dispatch) that the material sent to the Chinese Communists included 2,500 tons of Malayan rubber per month!
Chiang‘s forces, despite frequent belittlings in certain newspapers and by certain radio commentators, were and are by no means negligible. His failure on the mainland had resulted directly from our withholding of ammunition and other supplies but, as shown above, he successfully covered his retreat to Formosa.
According to Major General Claire Chennault of the famed Flying Tigers and Senator Knowland of California—a World War II Major and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who investigatedindependently, Chiang late in 1950 had about 500,000 trained troops on Formosa and considerable materiel. The number was placed at 600,000 by General MacArthur in his historic address to the two houses of the Congress on April 19, 1951.
Our action against Chiang had one effect, so obvious as to seem planned. By our order to the Seventh Fleet, the Communist armies which Chiang was pinning down were free to support the Chinese Communist forces assembled on the Korean border to watch our operations. Despite our State Department‘s assumption that the Chinese Communists would not fight, those armies seized the moment of their reinforcement from the South. which coincided with the extreme lengthening of our supply lines, and entered the war in November, 1950, thirteen days after the election of a pro-Acheson Democratic congress.
In his appearance before the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate in May, 1951, General MacArthur testified that two Chinese Communist armies which had been watching Chiang had been identified among our enemies in Korea. Thus our policy in the Strait of Formosa was instrumental in precipitating the Chinese Communist attack upon us whin victory in Korea was in our grasp.
Here then, in summary, was the situation when the Chinese Communists crossed the Yalu River in November, 1950: We had virtually supplied them with the sinews of war by preventing Chiang‘s interference with their import of strategic materials. We had released at least two of their armies for an attack on us by stopping Chiang‘s attacks on them. We not only, for political‖ reasons, had refused Chiang‘s offer of 33,000 of his best troops when the war broke out (How Asia‘s Policy Was Shaped: Civilians in the State Department Are Dictating Military Strategy of Nation, Johnson confirms, by Constantine Brown, The Evening Star, Washington, June 16, 1951), but even in the grave crisis in November, 1950, we turned down General MacArthur‘s plea that he be allowed to accept 60,000 of Chiang‘s troops.
These truths, which cannot be questioned by anyone, constitute a second barrage of evidence that the shapers of our policy sought defeat rather than victory. Had General MacArthur been permitted to use them, Chiang‘s loyal Chinese troops would not only have fought Communists, but, being of the same race and speaking the same or a related language, would no doubt have been able to induce many surrenders among the Red Chinese forces (see Uncle Sam, Executioner, The Freeman, June 18, 1951). If we had accepted the services of Chiang‘s troops, we would have also secured the great diplomatic advantage of rendering absurd, and probably preventing, the outcry in India, and possibly other Asiatic countries, that our operation in Korea was a new phase of Western imperialism.
But this was not all that our State Department and Presidential coterie did to prevent the victory of our troops in Korea. Despite the fact that the United Nations on October 7, 1950, voted by a big majority for crossing the 38th parallel to free North Korea, up to the Yalu River, we denied MacArthur‘s army the right to use air reconnaissance for acquiring intelligence indications of the Chinese Communist troops and facilities across that river.
This amazing denial of a commander‘s lives at last made clear to many Americans that we were fighting for some other objective besides victory. Coming, as it did, as one of a series of pro-Communist moves, this blindfolding of General MacArthur prompted Representative Joe Martin of Massachusetts, former Speaker of the House, to ask pointedly in his Lincoln Day Speech in New York (February 12, 1951): What are we in Korea for—to win or to lose ?
The denial of the right to reconnoiter and to bomb troop concentrations and facilities, after whole Chinese armies were committed against us, was very close to treason under the Constitutional prohibition (Article III, Section 3, paragraph 1) of giving aid and comfort to an enemy. In-fact, if a refusal to let our troops take in defense of their lives measures always recognized in warfare as not only permissible but obligatory does not constitute aid and comfort to the enemy, it is hard to conceive any action which might be so construed.
The pretense that by abstaining from reconnaissance and from the bombing of enemy supply lines we kept the Soviet out of the war makes sense only to the very ignorant or to those in whose eyes our State Department can do no wrong. A country such as the Soviet Union will make war when the available materiel is adequate, when its troops have been trained and concentrated for the proposed campaign, and when the government decides that conditions at home and abroad are favorable, not when some of its many cats-paws are bombed on one side or the other of an Asiatic river.
The only logical conclusion, therefore, and a conclusion arrived at by a whole succession of proofs, is that for some reason certain people with influence in high places wanted heavier American casualties in Korea, the final defeat of our forces there, and the elimination of MacArthur from the American scene.
But once again, MacArthur did not fail. Once again, under terrible odds, MacArthur first evaded and then stopped the enemy, an enemy sent against him by the Far Eastern policy of Truman and Acheson. According to General Bonner Fellers (UP, Baltimore, Md., May 11, 1952, New York Times), the Chinese field commanders in Korea in the Spring of 1951 were desperate and could not hold out much longer.
Apparently not wanting victory, the Truman-Acheson-Marshall clique acted accordingly. On April 10, 1951, General Douglas MacArthur‘s was dismissed from his Far Eastern command. With MacArthur‘s successor, our top echelon executives took no chances. Before a Floridan audience, the veteran radio commentator, H. V. Kaltenborn, spoke as follows: General Ridgeway told me in answer to my query as to why we can‘t win that he was under orders not to win (Article by Emilie Keyes, Palm Beach Post, Jan. 30, 1952).
The frantic dismissal of a great general who was also a popular and successful ruler of an occupied country caused a furor all over America. The General was invited to address the two houses of the Congress in joint session and did so on April 19, 1951. During the same hour, the President conferred, as he said later, with Dean Acheson, without turning on radio or television… and Mrs. Truman was at a horse race.
General MacArthur‘s speech will forever be a classic in military annals and among American State papers. It was followed shortly by an investigation of the circumstances leading to his dismissal—an investigation by the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations comittees of the Senate.
The millions of words of testimony before the combined Senate committees resulted in no action. The volume of questions and answers was so vast that few people or none could follow all of it, but certain good resulted—even over and above the awakening of the more alert Americans to the dangers of entrusting vital decisions to men with the mental processes of the secretaries of State and Defense. After the MacArthur investigation the American people (i) knew more about our casualties in Korea; (ii) learned of the Defense Department‘s acceptance of the idea of a bloody stalemate, and (iii) got a shocking documentary proof of the ineptitude or virtual treason of our foreign policy. These three topics will be developed in the order here listed.
(i) By May 24, 1951, eleven months after the Korean Communist troops crossed the 38th parallel, our own publicly admitted battle casualties had reached the recorded total of 69,276, a figure much larger than that for our casualties during the whole first full year (1942) of World War II (U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 1951, p. 14). On the subject of our casualties, Senator Bridges of New Hampshire, senior Republican member of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, revealed the further significant fact that as of April, 1951, Americans had suffered 94.6 per cent of all casualties among United Nations forces aiding South Korea (UP dispatch from Chicago, April 11, 1951). Parenthetically, the second United Nations member in the number of casualties in Korea was our Moslem co-belligerent, the Republic of Turkey. The casualties of South Korea were not considered in this connection since that unhappy land was not a UN member.